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On Review:
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Volume 5,
The Taney Period, 1836-64
By Carl B. Swisher
The MacMillan Company, New York: 1974.
Pp. I 041, including index.

Reviewed

by David S. Boge·n

1n the fifth volume of the Holmes Devise His-

tory of the Supreme Court,! the late Professor Carl Swisher, Taney's biographer, 2 has
written a history of the Court during Taney's
tenure as Chief Justice. Roger Taney stands
out in undistinguished surroundings. Justice
Story, who served nine of his thirty-four years
on the Court with Taney, seemed a relic of the
past. "I am the last of the old race of judges,"
Story wrote.s Justices Miller and Field, although appointed to the Court during Taney's
last years, wrote their major opinions after
his death. The most outstanding intellect on
the Taney court may have been Benjamin
Curtis, but he resigned and returned to private
practice after only six years. Most of Taney's
fellow justices remain in obscurity such as
Justice McKinley of whom Swisher writes, "He
made no significant contribution to legal thinking in any form." 4
Roger Taney rose to prominence as Andrew
Jackson's chief aide in opposition to the Bank
of the United States. This leadership provided
some basis for concern that Taney would exalt
state power at the expense of the federal government. Indeed, he did take the position that
1975

states had the power within their borders to
regulate interstate commerce unless contrary
to an express federal law. Thus the Chief Justice was relegated to a concurrence instead of
writing for the Court when Curtis developed
his theory that state power over interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action
depended on the nature of the commerce. 5
Roger Taney contributed much to legal
thought. While he assigned his associates many
more opinions on substantive matters than did
Marshall,6 Chief Justice Taney still wrote most
major opinions for the Court during this period. Where significant opinions were given to
others, the Chief Justice was often in dissent. 7
The first major c.ase of the Taney court was
Charles River Bridges where Taney said that
state grants of exclusive privileges should be
narrowly construed. Thus a charter to build a
bridge and collect the tolls was not violated by
a subsequent charter to another company to
build a competing bridge adjacent to the first.
Any fears that this decision presaged a gener.al abandonment of respect for contract obligations were dispelled in Bronson v. Kinzie 9
where Taney, writing for the Court, invali-
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The most successful decisions
of the Tane.y court ...
presented some interreaction
betwe.en the Court and the
other branches of
government.

dated an Illinois law as an impairment of contract.
Despite Taney's concerns over the reach of
federal power, he continued Marshall's tradition of federal supremacy. In Holmes v. Jennison,10 decided by an evenly divided Court,
Taney said that the governor of .a state could
not agree with the head of a foreign state to
surrender fugitives because states were forbidden to enter into any agreement with a
foreign power. In Ableman v. Booth, 11 Taney
wrote that state courts could not order the release of persons held under federal authority.
Taney's creative imagination provided the
foundation for modern admiralty law. In the
Genosee Chie/, 12 he surpassed even Story in
extending federal jurisdiction in admiralty.
80

Under the traditional view, admiralty jurisdiction extended within a country only to
waters affected by the tides. Taney argued for
the Court that the concept of tidewater was
appropriate in England because that small
island nation's navigable waterways were all
affected by the tide. That was not true in the
United States where large bodies of water like
the Great Lakes were major waters for shipping, but were not tidewaters. Thus, Taney
introduced the concept of navigability as the
basis for admiralty jurisdiction.
Patent law also owes much to Taney. Taney
sustained most of Samuel Morse's claims for
the invention of the telegraph in 0'Reilly v.
Morse, 13 but he also announced that no patent
could be given on a principle of nature as distinguished from a specific instrument exploiting a principle. Morse and Gayler v. Wilder14
(another Taney opinion) were milestones for
American p·atent law.
The most successful decisions of the Taney
court, however, presented some interreaction
between the Court and the other branches of
government. Taney won acclaim for his decision in Luther v. Borden,15 holding that the
decision which government was the rightful
government of a state was a political question
committed to the executive and not the judiciary for decision. In the Charles River
Bridge Case 16 and Bank of Augusta v. EarZe, 11
the legislatures were forced to be precise .and
explicit where valuable rights were at stake,
but they were permitted to act.
One virtue of Swisher's book is the way he
demonstrates the interrelationship between
disputes over state and federal power and the
issue of slavery. Like the slave quarters behind Taney's house in Frederick, Maryland,
slavery cast its shadow over the entire structure of law during this period. The constitutional scope of states' rights and federal power
were questioned by Southern attempts to recapture escaped slaves, to bar free negroes
from the state, and to reassert the slave status
of former slaves who had lived in free territory but returned voluntarily to a slave state.
Cases like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,t 8 The Schooner Armistad/ 9 Groves v. Slaughter20 and
Strader v. Graham 21 are products of the slavery controversy, yet they helped shape the
structure of federalism in areas far removed
from that issue. But Dred Scott v. Sandford22
had the greatest impact.
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The Dred Scott decision is not important for
its influence on the outbreak of the war, but
for leaving the Court powerless during the war.
The decision that Scott was not entitled to his
freedom could easily have been predicted on
the basis of Strader v. Graham. In fact, Justice Nelson was originally assigned the opinion
for the Court on the assumption that the decision of the Missouri Court finding that Scott
was still a slave under Missouri law was determinative of his status. However, the dissenters discussed the right of negroes to sue in
federal courts and the validity of the Missouri
Compromise barring slavery from the territories. Since the issues had been raised, Justice Taney decided to confront them directly.
Taney may have hoped that by preventing
negroes from using the federal courts to win
freedom and by preventing the federal government from legislating prohibitions on slavery,
the Court would relieve the Southern fears of
abolitionism which were driving toward secession. In Dred Scott, the Court foreclosed compromise. Political compromise was impossible
anyway. The Missouri Compromise treated in
the decision had already been repealed by the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. But Dred Scott made
the Court, instead of political realities, appear
the obstacle to compromise, so the Court itself
became the target for abolitionist wrath. 23 This
in turn left it powerless to deal effectively with
problems arising out of the war. That debiliating effect on the institution of the Court
gives Dr>ed Scott its unique importance in history.
With the onset of the Civil War, the Court
moved into the background of events. Legal
questions on the war's conduct occasionally
reached the Court, but only the Prize 24 cases
which upheld presidential power to impose a
blockade are notable. Taney did his best to protect dissent during the war. His opinion as circuit justice in Ex Parte M erryman25 risked
Lincoln's wrath to preserve habeas corpus unless suspended by congressional action. But
Swisher chronicles the impossibility of enforcing the writ and the mechanisms used to
avoid court tests, so that dissenters had to rely
on pres:idential grace. Taney's opinions on
civil liberties during the war were consistent
with his lifelong opposition to abuses of power,
but they were also consistent with his belief in
secession and his friendship with persons who
were jailed.
1975

This review has indicated the importance of
the Court's decisions during this period and the
influence of its Chief Justice, but it does not
capture the skill and vivacity with which Professor Swisher chronicles it. In telling the
Court's story during the Taney period,
Swisher has written the best of the three volumes so far in the Holmes Devise History of
the Supreme Court.26 He has used the correspondence, articles and speeches of the period
to let the participants tell about the events.
The total picture of the Court is here--quarrels
with the Reporter, 27 maneuvering for appoint-

Taney•s opinions on civil
libert·ie.s during the war were
consistent with his lifelong
opposition to abuses of power.
but they were also consistent
with his belief in secession
and his friendship with persons
who were iailed.

HeinOnline -- 5 Md. L. F. 81 1975-1976

81

ment, 28 even the living conditions of the Justices down to Justice Davis' assurances to his
wife that he tasted only one of the several different wines served at a dinner party.29 There
is an extraordinary portrait of Taney near his
death, writing to get more of his Sp-anish
cigars, complaining about the breakage of
bottles of wine sent him, facing financial difficulties and too feeble to make visits-writing
th.at he and his daughter were "fit for no place
but home and feel that we ought not to sadden
the homes of our friends by bringing to them
our daily aches and pains."so
The same bright and shiny objects which
make The Taney Period such fascinating
reading produce two objections. The first is
the unnecessary repetition of attractive quotes.
We know Story better for Lord Morpeth's
statement that "when he was in the room few
others could get in a word." 31 Justice Daniel's
indignant letter protesting his Circuit Court
duties is equally instructive: "I am here two
thousand miles from home (calculating by the
travelling route,) on a pilgrimage by an exposure to which, it was the calculation of federalist malignity that I would be driven from
the Bench."82 But in each case, once is enough, 33
The second criticism is both larger and more
debatable. Swisher devotes space to colorful

cases that could be used to trace individual
judges' intellectual development. For example,
he devotes sixteen pages of one chapter84 to
Myra Gaines' suit to inherit land in the heart
of New Orleans. The financial stakes were high
and the stories of romantic liaisons and secret
marriages are colorful indeed. But the Louisiana laws on illegitimacy were not yet ripe to
make legal history, 35 so the case is preserved
for its color and not its legal importance. To
some extent the same is true of the almost
forty pages36 devoted to California land claims
after the discovery of gold. Great names, great
sums and great chicanery abounded, but great
law did not. The substance of both chapters is
essential to a true picture of the business of
the Court, but they could have been condensed
from the detailed treatment given.
Although both chapters are enjoyable reading, they have squeezed out discussion of Justice Curtis' development from slave-owner's
counsel to his Dred Scott dissent. Curtis was on
the Court partly because of his prominence in
Commonwealth v. Aves87 representing the
owner whose slave accompanied him to Boston
and who claimed the right to take her back to
Southern territory as a slave. Curtis' defense
of congressional power to enact the Missouri
Compromise is not surprising, but his opinion

Great names. great sums and great chicanery a bounded, but
great law did not.
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Taney himself had emancipated all his slaves except for
two, who were too old to provide for themse.lves, more than
thirty years before the Dred Scott
decision. He even made a speech in 1819
characterizing slavery as a blot on the. national character.

that Dred Scott must be free on his voluntary
return to slave territory needed explanation.
Was Curtis converted by his teacher Story into
an abolitionist along with his nationalizing
view of common law? Was he influenced by his
brother, George Curtis, who was one of the
counsel for Dred Scott? Were his actions in
Aves as an attorney contrary to his personal
views? Did he change his mind or could he
make his advocacy in Aves and his dissent in
Dred Scott consistent? The questions arise
naturally, but Swisher avoids conjecture.
These blemishes, whether real or in the eye
of this beholder, are insignificant in comparison to the merits of the book. After many
years of controversy, Roger Taney has many
memorials. His bust is in the Supreme Court, as
his old home in Frederick is a national shrine,89
and even Professor Swisher's earlier book
honors him. But this book places him accurately in the midst of his times and is his :finest
memorial. A memorial honors both the person
and the artisan who builds it. This outstanding
volume in the Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court honors Chief Justice Taney,
his associates, and its author, Carl Swisher.
1975

FOOTNOTES
1
C. SWISHER, 5 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE 'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64 (1974) [:herein·after SWISHER].
2
C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935).
a SWISHER at 93.
4
!d. at 67. McKinley, of course, was the least distinguished of all the judges, with little to show for his
fifteen years on the bench except illness and complaints
from his Circuit. Other justices were both more colorful and more ·acute, but their contributions to the development of constitutional law by their opinions are
minor in comp•arison to Taney or more noted later
judges.
'·Cooley v. Bo•ard of Wardens of the Port of Phliladelphi:a, 12 How. 299 (1852). This case is discussed in
SWISHER ·at 404-7.
6
SWISHER at 98, 968.
7
See Smith Thompson's opinion in Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), ordering the Postmaster
General to pay certain sum·s, with T•aney dissenting
on procedural grounds. See also the opinions of Justice
·Curtis in Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens and Justice Grier
in the Prize eases.
8
Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, 11
Pet. 420 (1837). This case is discussed in SWISHER at
74-98.
"1 How. 311 (1843) is discussed in SWISHER at 14752. The position of the Court in Bronson was accepted
for nearly a century, but in Home Building and lizyan
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the Court expanded
its view of the legitimate use of government power .to
protect debtors during times of emergency.
10
14 Pet. 540 (1840) is discussed in SWISHER at
174-77.
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11
Ableman v. Bo'Oth, 21 How. 506 (1859), i's discussed
in SWISHER at 653-72.
12
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443
(1852), is discussed in SWISHER at 442-47. Story was
fabled for his extensions of the admiralty power, so it
was said "if a bucket of water were brought into his
court with ·a corn cob floating in it, he would at once
extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
over it." SWISHER at 425. Yet even Story clung to the
concept that admiralty extended only to waters within
the ebb and flow of the tide. The Thomas Jefferson, 10
Wheat. 428, 429 (1825). Story would have found jurisdiction to regulate traffic on inland waterways in the
Commerce ·Clause, but it was Taney's aversion to extensions of federal power through the Commerce Clause
that led him to base jurisdiction in 'admiralty.
13
15 How. 62 (1854) is discussed in SWISHER at
488-504.
14
10 How. 477 (1851) is discussed in SWISHER at
510-11. Gayler established the principle that a discovery which was never made public and finally was
forgotten or abandoned would not prevent a patent
for a person who later invented the same machine.
Justice Nels·on had so charged the jury below, but
Taney wrote the Supreme Court's opinion.
"'7 How. 1 (1849) is discussed in SWISHER at 51527.
'" 11 Pet. 420.
17
13 Pet. 519 (1839), where the Court held that
foreign corporations were 'assumed to have the right
to make contracts through their agents in other states
unles·s such other state specifically prohibited it. The
case is discussed in SWISHER at 115-21.
18
16 Pet. 539 (1842), where it was held that the
federal Fugitive Slave Law preempts state jurisdiction
over kidnapping an escaped slave. The case is discussed in SWISHER •at 537-47.
19
15 Pet. 518 (1841), holding ·the Court will look
into the underlying facts in a ·dispute over a treaty
provision. It declared that persons who had been ill~
gaily enslaved and rebelled to take 'Over the slave ship
were not subject to the treaty with Spain which provided for restoration of ships •and property seized by
pirates or robbers despite the representations of both
Spain and the executive branch of the United States
government that the treaty ·applied and underlying
facts should not be examined by the Court. The case
is discussed in SWISHER at 189-96.
""15 Pet. 449 (1841), where the Court held that a
provision in the Mississippi Constitution forbidding
imp'ortation into state for sale was not effective until
an implementing statute was passed. Thus ,a debt contracted for the purchase of slaves before the statute
was valid •and could be enforced. However, the issue
of the power of a state to forbid such commerce was
argued in the case and produced great diversity of
opinion. The case Is discussed in SWISHER at 365-70.
21
10 How. 82, 97 (1851), where the Court held that
while in Kentucky the status of negroes was determined by Kentucky law and not by that of the free
state where they had resided for some time ·or by the
laws of the United States. Thus persons who aided
their escape were liable to their owner in damages.
This case is discussed in SWISHER at 556-58.
••19 How. 393 (1857) is discus·sed in SWISHER at
592-652.
23
Chief Justice T·aney did not enhance the Court's
reputation by his statement that 'at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution negroes were considered
as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority and had no rights or privileges but such as
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those who held the power and the government might
choose to grant them." Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How.
393, 404-5 (1857). But the ready attribution of Taney's
understanding of the historical record to Taney's personal views was probably affected by outrage a.t the
other aspects of the case. Taney himself had emancipated all his slaves except for two, who were too old
to provide for themselves, more than thirty years
before the decision. See SWISHER at 644. He even made
·a speech in 1819 characterizing slavery as ·a blot on the
national character. See SWISHER ·at 740.
24
2 Black 635 (1863) is discussed in SWISHER at
877-900. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the
Court with Taney dissenting on the grounds that the
blockade was no·t legal until authorized by Congress.
However, all the judges concurred that the blockade
was proper after the date when Congress ratified it.
This decision received much attention in recent years,
and Jus·tice Taney''s position on the illegality of war
measures without a declaration of war by Congress
was warmly supported by many opponents. of American involvement in Vietn·a:m.
.. 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) is discussed in
SWISHER at 840-54. John Merryman was arrested in
his home in Cockeysville. He wa·s a prominent f'armer
and a member of the Maryl·and legislature. His father
h·ad attended Dickinson in the same period as Chief
Justice Taney.
26
J. GOEBEL, HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT, VOL. I, ANTECENDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
TO 1801 ( 1971), reviewed by this reviewer 4 MD. L.
FORUM 77 (1974); FAIRMAN, HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT, VoL. VI, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION, 1864-88 PART ONE (1971), reviewed by this
reviewer 3 MD. L. FORUM 20 (1972); ·and SWISHER,
reviewed herein.
01
SWISHER at 296-319.
28
Id. at 205-47 and at 311-40.
29
Id. at 836.
30
Id. 'at 964-65.
81
I d. at 43.
32
I d. •at 69.
33
Morpeth's quote on Story is repeated at 263 of
SWISHER; Daniels' letter reappears in full at 258.
34
SwrsHER at 756-72. The Gaines litigation reached
the Supreme Court fifteen times on different issues.
Ex parte Whitney, 13 Pet. 404 (1839); Gaines v. Relf,
15 Pet. 9 (1841); Gaines v. Chew, 2 H'Ow. 619 (1844);
Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (1848); Gaines v.
Relf, 12 How. 472 (1852); and Gaines v. Hennen, 24
How. 553 (1861) were decided during Taney's term in
office, but the litigation continued until 1891.
"' Myra's claim depended upon a finding of legitimacy for under Louisiana law ·a father's property
could not be passed by will to illegitimate descendants.
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
Louisiana's law disadvantaging illegitimates came
within constitutional scrutiny and bas recently been
the subject of ·a number of cases interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause. Levy v. Louisi ana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968) ; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971);
and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Go., 406 U.S.
164 (1972).
"' SWISHER at 773-810.
"35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) is discussed in
SWISHER 'at 554.
38
SWISHER at 372. Senator Charles Sumner was for
many years able to prevent the appropriation of money
for such a bus:t, but it was appropri-ated without controversy in connection with appropriation for the bust
of T'aney's successor Salmon P. Chase.
'" SWISHER at 973. The house, at 121 South Bentz
Street, is maintained as a shrine not only to Taney
but ·also to his •brother-in-law Francis Scott Key.
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